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Introduction
The deposition of King Ferdinand VII
and the disappearance of the Spanish monarchy
in 1808 provided the necessary momentum
for Venezuelan-born Simón Bolívar to lead the
Spanish colonies in South America to pursue
independence. In order to have a strong unified
force to fight against Spain, Bolívar united pres-
ent-day Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and
Panama under a single nation called Gran
Colombia in 1819. Although Bolívar hoped that
Gran Colombia would be maintained after the
independence movement, difficulties soon
emerged that caused Venezuela to declare inde-
pendence in 1831. Ever since the dissolution
of Bolívar’s Gran Colombia, Colombia and
Venezuela have experienced tensions that have
led them to the brink of war. 
Immediately following the dissolution of
Gran Colombia in 1831, conflict originated
between Colombia and Venezuela over land and
maritime boundaries and border disputes. These
territorial conflicts continued into the 1980s,
but the nature of tensions between Colombia
and Venezuela changed with the election of
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in 1998.
Chávez’s ambitious plan of becoming the leader
of a unified Latin American region (similar to
Bolívar’s Gran Colombia) caused him to support
Colombia’s most prominent guerilla group, the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colom-
bia (FARC). Chávez supported the FARC because
they considered themselves followers of Simón
Bolívar, the original leader of the independence
and unification movements in South America.
However, his support for the FARC’s activities
created intense security concerns within Colom-
bia and along the Colombia/Venezuela border.
In addition, Chávez’s goal of a united Latin
America conflicted with Colombia’s alliance
with the United States at the beginning of the
twenty-first century. Colombia allowed the
United States to set up military bases in its
territory in order to help fight guerilla and drug
activity, a move Chávez considered a violation
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of Venezuelan sovereignty that would inhibit his
plans of a united region of solely Latin Ameri-
can countries. These conflicts led to a freeze
in diplomatic relations and an arms race that
caused preparations for war. 
In this article, I examine the shared his-
tory of Colombia and Venezuela under Gran
Colombia as groundwork for analyzing both the
historical tensions and current conflicts that
have arisen since the dissolution of Gran Colom-
bia in 1831. Despite the historical territorial dis-
putes and the tensions emerging after the
election of President Chávez in 1998, I claim
that it is unlikely that war will erupt between
Colombia and Venezuela. Both countries have
recently begun to realize the benefits of coop-
eration, and although tensions may remain due
to domestic political concerns, cooperation will
prevent any permanent rupture of relations. 
The Shared History of Colombia and
Venezuela
The relationship between Colombia and
Venezuela dates back to Spanish explorations of
the 1500s. With the goal of improving Spain’s
influence over its colonies in South America,
the Bourbon regime created the New King-
dom of Granada in 1717, combining present-day
Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama.
However, the Venezuelan-born General Simón
Bolívar recognized Spain’s weakness following
the deposition of King Ferdinand VII in 1808
as a ripe time to lead an independence move-
ment throughout all of South America. After
failed attempts to liberate his home territory
of Venezuela in the early 1800s, Bolívar sought
a military alliance between Venezuela’s neigh-
boring territories that would be similar to the
New Kingdom of Granada established by the
Bourbon regime. He believed that the indepen-
dence of one territory depended on the libera-
tion of another, such that joining the territories
of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama
into a military alliance was necessary to end-
ing Spanish rule (Safford and Palacios, pp. 56,
105). Bolívar successfully unified the territories
in 1819, calling it Gran Colombia. This union,
believed by Bolívar to be a crucial step in fight-
ing for independence, would also provide him
with a large enough territory to successfully
defend against future foreign invasions.
From the initial creation of Gran Colom-
bia, however, Bolívar maintained an attitude of
doubt about its long-term survival (Collier, 
p. 59). Gran Colombia was successful in lib-
erating South American territories from Span-
ish colonial rule, and both Venezuelan and
Colombian army camps answered to Bolívar as
the Supreme Commander of both armies dur-
ing battle. However, after independence was
achieved, conflicts of representation and
national identity replaced the militaristic unity
previously felt during the struggle for inde-
pendence (Bushnell, p. 50). For example, com-
petition occurred soon after independence
between the lawyers in Colombia and the
military officials in Venezuela over who would
have the authority to rule Gran Colombia. In
Colombia, the lawyers and legislators resented
the burden of the violent and dominant
Venezuelan military on the national budget,
while the Venezuelan military officials criti-
cized the Colombian lawyers and legislators for
enjoying the fruits of the military’s hard work
(Safford and Palacios, pp. 115–16). In addition,
the heterogeneous masses that existed within
each territory of Gran Colombia, such as the
pardos1 of Venezuela and the mestizos of
Colombia, made the formation of a single Gran
Colombian “national identity” impossible,
because each population found its nationality
within its home country (Lynch, pp. 219–20). 
As Bolívar admitted, “The south hates the
north, the coast hates the highlands, Venezuela
hates Cundinamarca”2 (Lynch, p. 218). This
obvious lack of cohesion within the republic of
Gran Colombia proved a serious barrier to its
survival.
Perhaps the most important division
between Colombia and Venezuela, however,
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1Pardo is another term for mulatto, or of mixed white
and black descent. This is in contrast to mestizo, which
refers to mixed white and Indian descent (Lynch, p. 342).
The differences of ethnicity between these groups created
difficulty in combining them to form a single national
origin or national identity.
2Cundinamarca is one of the 32 departments plus the
Capital District by which Colombia is organized. Cundi-
namarca surrounds the Capital District, which contains
Colombia’s capital, Bogotá. The reference to Cundinamarca
in Simón Bolívar’s quote refers to the capital region in
Bogotá that ruled over all of Gran Colombia during its exis-
tence from 1819 to 1830.
stemmed from the placement of the capital of
Gran Colombia in Bogotá, Colombia. The
sheer size of Gran Colombia made Bogotá
nearly inaccessible to Venezuela, which
robbed Venezuelans of adequate physical rep-
resentation in the capital. In addition, the
constitution drafted by Simón Bolívar in 1821
denied individual territories from exercising
discretionary power over internal affairs,
requiring that all decisions be referred to
Bogotá. Venezuelans soon came to regard
Colombian politicians as foreign masters
and themselves a colony, because Bogotá
was the center of offices and opportunities for
both the bureaucracy and public works pro-
grams (Lynch, p. 220). It was not long until
José Antonio Páez, commander-general of
Venezuela, began to receive support for his
open resentment of Gran Colombia’s political
structure. Despite Bolívar’s desperate
attempts to maintain Gran Colombia, Páez
used his support within Venezuela to lead a
separatist movement, culminating with
Venezuela’s secession from Gran Colombia in
1831 (Safford and Palacios, pp. 117–29; Lynch,
pp. 226–30).
The dissolution of Gran Colombia cre-
ated immediate challenges for the previously
united territories. One of the greatest challenges
was the establishment of territorial bound-
aries (Safford and Palacios, p. 132). Because
national identity had been established within
each territory as opposed to a united Gran
Colombian identity, questions of territorial
boundaries also inherited a struggle for power
and pride within the region. Venezuela was espe-
cially eager to reassert itself in the region
because the people in Venezuela, in particular
the military, felt as though they had been robbed
of representation under the central government
of Gran Colombia. Venezuela and Colombia
competed over three primary territorial dis-
agreements following the breakup of Gran
Colombia: recovering territory lost by Venezuela
during a series of treaties signed after the dis-
solution of Gran Colombia, maritime bound-
ary disputes, and illegal activity along the shared
borders between Colombia and Venezuela
(Child, 1985, p. 59). These territorial disputes
continued into the 1980s, as both countries con-
tinued to compete for power and influence in
the region.
Territorial Conflicts
Recovery of Lost Territory 
Territorial conflicts were common in
South American countries during the colonial
times, when boundaries were loosely defined
in the core regions because European settlers
were more attracted to peripheral coastal lands.
As a result, when South American colonies
began fighting for independence, confusion
quickly arose over the loosely defined borders
in the core of the country (Child, 1985, p. 9).
The countries united under Gran Colombia
were particularly affected by these loosely
defined borders, as independence was won when
Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama
were considered one territory. The breakup of
Gran Colombia, therefore, created great uncer-
tainty over boundaries and initiated tensions
between Colombia and Venezuela.
After declaring independence from Gran
Colombia, both Venezuela and Colombia sought
to ease the ambiguity over territorial borders
with the Treaty of Pombo-Michelena in 1833.
While the treaty was ratified by Colombia,
Venezuela refused to sign it, regarding the
provisions of the treaty as an unacceptable
loss of territory (Anderson). The two countries
then requested assistance from King Alfonso XII
of Spain in 1881, and an arbitration agree-
ment was created in 1891 that primarily
addressed unsettled boundaries in the Guajira
Peninsula (the most northern tip of South
America [Figure 1], located in northern Colom-
bia and northwestern Venezuela, which extends
from the Gulf of Venezuela and from the
Caribbean). Colombia and Venezuela agreed to
a joint commission to supervise the execution
of the arbitration made by the Spanish Crown,
but inaccurate maps and difficulty in locating
the physical designations of the boundary lines
led both countries to reject the treaty (Ander-
son). Colombia and Venezuela then enlisted the
help of the Swiss Council in 1916, which cre-
ated a final arbitration in 1932 that upheld
the Spanish Crown’s original agreement. 
While the boundaries between Colom-
bia and Venezuela were lawfully determined
by the Swiss Council’s arbitration in 1932,
domestic pressure from groups and leaders 
in Venezuela pushed for an extension of
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Venezuela’s boundaries. For example, in his
1980 address to the Venezuelan Congress, Pres-
ident Luis Herrera Campíns pledged to recover
territory that was lost in the 1932 arbitration
(Ewell, p. 295). In addition, Venezuelan military
officials, such as Major Pérez Tenreiro and López
Sánchez, also spoke out in the 1980s about
the recovery of lost territory. Both of these
military officials referred to the power and pres-
tige that Venezuela enjoyed under the leader-
ship of Simón Bolívar to aggressively urge
Venezuela to gain back territory that had been
given to Colombia during the 1932 arbitra-
tion. The definition of territorial boundaries
continued to penetrate Venezuelan politics in
the last decades of the twentieth century, which
created hostility and competition between
Colombia and Venezuela (Ewell, pp. 307–8).
Maritime Boundaries
The second territorial tension between
Colombia and Venezuela originating from the
dissolution of Gran Colombia in 1831 was dis-
putes over maritime boundaries and the later
importance of securing energy resources from
the Gulf of Venezuela. Located at the north-
ernmost frontier between Colombia and
Venezuela, the boundaries of the Gulf were sup-
posedly settled in the 1941 Treaty on Border
Demarcation and Navigation of Common Rivers
(see Figure 1). However, issues, such as sub-
soil rights and extensions of territory, were of
little concern in the 1940s, as the potential for
petroleum reserves had yet to be discovered in
the area at that time. Despite lack of concern for
resources, Venezuela still felt that the treaty was
overly generous to Colombia and encroached on
Venezuelan sovereignty, provoking the Colom-
bian foreign ministry to respond in 1952 by
renouncing all claims to the islands in the
Gulf in order to appease Venezuela’s complaints.
However, by 1965, oil companies from the
United States had requested concessions in
order to explore the Gulf of Venezuela, ignit-
ing an interest by both Colombia and Venezuela
to reconsider the “delimitation of the marine
and submarine areas” between the two coun-
tries (Birken). After numerous violent incidents
by both countries to exercise sovereignty in the
Gulf, it became clear that the struggle for oil
resources in the area would cause a longer
and more serious competition. The nationaliza-
tion of the Venezuelan oil industry in 1976
placed even greater importance on Venezuela’s
ability to secure its sovereignty in the Gulf, as
its growing dependence on oil revenues required
a secure supply of resources (Bell et al., p. 362).
Maritime boundary disputes between Colombia
and Venezuela over sovereignty of the Gulf of
Venezuela have gone unresolved and continue
to cause competition between the two countries. 
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Figure 1
Guajira Peninsula and the Gulf of Venezuela
Source: Briceño as reproduced in Anderson and ESRI World Countries 2011
(with special thanks to Scott Rutzmoser, Lehigh University).
Development of Frontier Regions
While the intensity of some conflicts on the
borders between South American countries is
minimal, because these areas are empty and
unpopulated, the development and growth of the
frontier between Colombia and Venezuela have
caused considerable tension. The indigenous peo-
ple who settled in Colombia’s frontier regions
bordering Venezuela numbered around 23,000
by 1930. Although this population accounted for
less than one percent of Colombia’s total popu-
lation of close to eight million, the interaction
with the Venezuelan people bordering this region
was significant. Colombia’s frontier regions were
physically isolated from their government and
city center by the Andean mountains, which
meant that the Venezuelan people living on the
border of the Colombian frontier exerted more
influence over these regions than did the Colom-
bian government. For example, Venezuelans
living on the frontier, who established Arauca City
in Colombia in the late eighteenth century and
promoted the development of cattle ranching and
commerce, threatened public order with the flow
of Venezuelan refugees and fugitives into the
Colombian frontier during Venezuela’s civil wars
and repressive regime of Juan Vicente Gómez
in the first quarter of the twentieth century
(Rausch, pp. 128–34). The free flow of people and
livestock across the Colombia/Venezuela border
eventually led to activities, such as illegal immi-
gration, smuggling, and guerilla activity in the
twentieth century, all of which have increased
tension between Colombia and Venezuela. 
Illegal immigration by Colombian citizens
into Venezuela saw its peak in the 1970s, when
Venezuela was experiencing an economic boom
due to rising oil prices. It is estimated that by
the end of the 1970s, 1.5 million undocumented
Colombians lived and worked illegally in
Venezuela (Child, 1985, p. 154). While Venezuela
was experiencing economic growth and a higher
standard of living than Colombia in the 1970s,
the economic crisis of the 1980s caused xeno-
phobic feelings towards the Colombian immi-
grants in Venezuela and created hostility
between the Colombian and Venezuelan govern-
ments. In addition, Colombian guerillas have
been responsible for causing tensions between
Colombia and Venezuela along the border
regions. Since the 1980s, kidnapping and drug
trafficking have become attractive methods by
which Colombian guerilla groups earn money.
Aside from drugs, other items, such as gasoline,
food, and arms, are also smuggled between
the border regions both by guerilla groups
and residents of the border regions (“Venezuela/
Colombia: Border Tensions”). These activities
are serious threats to the security of both
Colombia and Venezuela and have aggravated
present-day relations between them. 
Beginnings of the U.S. Relationship
with Latin America
In addition to territorial disputes between
Colombia and Venezuela, ideological differences
began to emerge over the role of the United
States in South America. Simón Bolívar’s cre-
ation of a military union with Gran Colombia in
1819 first ignited ideas about a mutual defense
system involving the rest of the hemisphere.
Efforts by Bolívar at the 1826 Congress of
Panama to unite all Latin American countries
into a collective security organization began
to spark interest from the United States. Invit-
ing Mexico, Central and South America, Haiti,
and Santo Domingo to a conference in Wash-
ington in 1889, the United States laid the
groundwork for an Inter-American Military Sys-
tem (IAMS). A series of conferences and treaties
followed, establishing political and military
security systems between the United States and
Latin America, such as the Rio Treaty in 1947
and the Organization of American States (OAS)
in 1948 (Child, 1980). 
Despite the creation of the IAMS, the
reluctance of Latin American countries to join
the system was detected as early as the Lima
Conference held in 1938. Although Argentina
was the biggest opponent, many other Latin
American countries were concerned about an
intervention by the United States that could
“open the door to constantly expanding U.S.
penetration into their [Latin American] affairs”
(Child, 1980, p. 22), which came true during the
U.S. military interventions in Panama and Haiti
of the last decade of the twentieth century (Gott,
p. 185). Furthermore, problems were identi-
fied immediately after the creation of the IAMS,
as the United States was either unable or unwill-
ing to supply adequate weapons to Latin Amer-
ica. For example, while the Lend-Lease Act of
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1941 provided the legal mechanism for the
United States to provide weapons, the practi-
cal needs of the U.S. military prevented it from
offering an adequate supply of weapons to Latin
America.3 Furthermore, although the Inter-
American Military Cooperation Act of 1946–1947
permitted the United States to sell surplus
weapons to Latin America throughout the
interim period of 1948, the volume and types of
weapons came nowhere near what was expected.
These incidents left Latin American leaders hes-
itant to join a security alliance with the United
States (Child, 1980, pp. 34, 95). Loss of confi-
dence in the United States came to a head in the
early 1980s, when the OAS failed in its peace-
keeping responsibilities during the 1982 Falk-
lands War, when the United States sided with
Great Britain over Argentina in that dispute.
After the Falklands War, Venezuelan military
officers proposed the idea of moving the Inter-
American Defense Board from Washington,
D.C., to the capital of Venezuela, Caracas, in
order to decrease U.S. influence in the area
(Child, 1985, pp. 10–12). This proposal high-
lighted Venezuela’s distrust of U.S. influence
in Latin America and would be the origin of
future tensions between Venezuela and Colom-
bia, as Colombia has recently allowed the United
States to have a greater presence in Latin Amer-
ica through Plan Colombia and the Defense
Cooperation Agreement (discussed later).
Tensions at the Turn of the Century
Although territorial conflicts shaped the
relationship between Colombia and Venezuela
throughout the twentieth century, the nature
of conflict changed and heightened with the
election of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez
in 1998 and his Bolivarian Revolutionary Move-
ment goals. Chávez began his campaign for a
Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement as a polit-
ical cell among military officials in the 1980s,
in which he identified himself with Simón Bolí-
var to garner support for a united Latin Amer-
ica. Bolivar had attempted such unification dur-
ing the 1826 Congress of Panama, but the
dissolution of Gran Colombia and Bolivar’s
death destroyed this vision. Chávez inherited
Bolivar’s dream more than a century later and
received enough support for his Bolivarian Rev-
olutionary Movement to win the presidential
election in 1998. His goal was to place
Venezuela’s own city center of Caracas at the
heart of a united continent (Gott, p. 13). He
pushed for Venezuela to take the lead on all
issues of integration: establishing economic
integration by creating a Latin American cur-
rency and solidifying political integration by
convening a congreso anfictionico, a congress
of all Bolivarian states, in Venezuela’s capital
of Caracas (Gott, pp. 184, 189). Chávez also used
Bolívar’s name to pursue additional policies,
such as integrating the armed forces into soci-
ety through a plan called “Plan Bolívar 2000”
and proposing to change Venezuela’s official
name to the “Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”
(Gott, p. 143). However, the Bolivarian Revo-
lutionary Movement created tensions between
Colombia and Venezuela in two major areas:
Chávez’s support of Colombia’s most powerful
guerilla movement, the FARC, and Chávez’s
opposition to Colombia’s relationship with the
United States. 
Role of the FARC in Creating
Tensions 
The FARC was founded in 1966 by Com-
munist Party leader Manuel Marulanda, but
its roots can be traced as far back as the 1930s.
Regional armed movements were first formed
by peasants in the Colombian countryside as a
response to the harsh working conditions
imposed on them by the coffee plantation own-
ers in the 1920s and 1930s (Vargas). These
movements developed into self-defense organ-
izations with leftist roots during the period of
La Violencia,4 as peasants formed armed units
in order to flee from political violence (“FARC”).
The Communist Party was able to consolidate
the armed peasants and incorporate guerilla
activity into the self-defense units to create
the FARC in 1966. The initial intentions of the
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3The major priorities of the United States during
the early 1940s were to offer Lend-Lease aid to Britain
and to supply itself with adequate military weapons. These
priorities became especially acute in 1941 just after Pearl
Harbor, as the U.S. War Department advised that “the
great demands for military equipment resulting from
Japan’s attacks have made it practically impossible to find
anything [weapons] for the immediate or even reasonably
prompt delivery to Latin American Republics” (Child, 1980,
p. 34).
FARC were to use the support base of the peas-
ants to seize political power. In 1984 the FARC
created a political party, the Unión Patriótica,
with the hopes of creating a successful leftist
party within the government. By “combining
various forms of struggle,” the FARC used
legal political activity in its creation of the Unión
Patriótica but also employed illegal activity, such
as taxing farmers involved in the drug trade and
kidnapping citizens and government officials for
ransom (Vargas). Guerilla activity reached its
peak in the 1990s while FARC’s political power
waned, causing it to resort solely to violence and
illegal activity. However, since the turn of the
century, the Colombian government has been
open to negotiating with the FARC and employ-
ing the help of international actors, such as
the United States, which has brought about a
decline in the violence caused by guerilla activ-
ity in Colombia (“FARC”; Vargas). 
One major inhibiting factor to ending
the security threat posed by the FARC came
from Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez. From its forma-
tion in 1966, the FARC has described itself as
a Bolivarian movement after the visions of
Simón Bolívar (supporting Bolívar’s vision of
a united Latin America). Chávez saw a formi-
dable political ally in the FARC, because its suc-
cessful incorporation into the Colombian gov-
ernment could have made Chávez’s dream of
re-creating a united Latin America (such as
Gran Colombia) a reality. Chávez supported the
FARC’s activities by offering safe havens in
Venezuela for its members and seeking peace
negotiations with the guerillas (Gott, p. 193).
His support of the FARC has caused a great deal
of tension between Colombia and Venezuela,
particularly during Colombian President Álvaro
Uribe’s presidency (2002–2008). 
Uribe used a confrontational approach in
outwardly accusing Chávez of harboring FARC
rebels and allowing them to freely cross the bor-
der into Venezuela. In both 2005 and 2007,
disputes over the FARC angered Chávez, caus-
ing him to pull Venezuela’s ambassador out of
Colombia and to categorize Venezuela’s relation-
ship with Colombia as a “most serious” crisis
(Tullos). On March 1, 2008, after presenting evi-
dence to the OAS that Chávez had been aiding
the FARC, President Uribe ordered an attack
in Ecuador to capture the FARC’s second in
command, Luis Edgar Silva or “Raúl Reyes”
(“Colombia/Venezuela Politics . . .”). This inci-
dent uncovered evidence that Silva had been
previously supported by the Venezuelan govern-
ment, which again angered Chávez and caused
him to temporarily cut diplomatic ties with
Colombia. Chávez even suspended trade rela-
tions and prepared for war by ordering troops
to the Colombia/Venezuela border as a result
of the dispute in Ecuador (“United States Con-
gress . . . ,” p. 2). These examples reveal that
Chávez’s support of the FARC in his quest to
become a regional leader not only has under-
mined Colombia’s interest in increasing
national security but also ruptured diplomatic
relations between the countries. 
Tensions Arising from Colombia’s
Alliance with the United States
As discussed previously, Venezuelan lead-
ers began losing trust in U.S. involvement in
Latin American affairs as early as the creation
of the IAMS in the 1890s. This loss of confidence
continued into the twenty-first century, when
Chávez was especially wary of U.S. involve-
ment in Latin American affairs. He claimed that
U.S. involvement thwarted his Bolivarian mis-
sion of a purely Latin American unity with
Venezuela as its most prominent actor. To elim-
inate the United States in Latin American affairs,
Chávez proposed to the Andean Parliament in
November 1999 a Latin American NATO that
would exclude the United States (Gott, p. 185).
However, this vision runs contrary to Colom-
bia’s alliance with the United States, because
Colombia has allowed the United States to set
up bases in order to help solve its problems of
drug trafficking and guerilla activity. This
alliance reached its peak in 1999 when Colom-
bian President Andrés Pastrana created an
agreement that would be heralded as the most
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4La Violencia was a ten-year period (1948–1958) of
civil war in Colombia between the Conservative Party and
the Liberal Party. La Violencia began in 1948 with the mur-
der of Liberal Party politician and presidential candidate
Jorge E. Gaitán and led to violence that started in Bogotá
but later became pervasive in the Colombian countryside.
La Violencia killed around 200,000 people and forced
hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes to avoid
being the targets of violence due to political affiliation. This
civil war ended with the creation of the National Front Gov-
ernment, a coalition of conservatives and liberals, in 1958
(“FARC”; Vargas). 
ambitious campaign against drug trafficking
in history (Livingstone, p. 123). Named Plan
Colombia, the agreement would contribute
more than $8 billion between FY2000 and
FY2012 to stopping violence, creating peace,
ending drug trafficking, and strengthening
the Colombian military and economy. Another
agreement, the Defense Cooperation Agree-
ment, announced by Colombian President Uribe
in 2009, allowed the United States to establish
military bases on its territory in order to con-
duct anti–drug trafficking and antiterrorism
operations within Colombia. Although the
United States assured that the sole purpose of
the bases was to aid in eliminating drug traffick-
ing in Colombia, Chávez was concerned that the
United States was using the bases to establish
military forces to target Venezuela. Announcing
that Colombia’s agreement to allow U.S. mili-
tary bases in Latin America was a declaration
of war against the Bolivarian Revolution, Chávez
suspended diplomatic relations and made prepa-
rations for war with Colombia in 2010 (Mar-
tinez). 
Cooperation despite Conflict
Since 2005, Chávez had cut diplomatic ties
with Colombia numerous times and even began
preparations for war in 2010 (Tullos). Con-
flicts concerning both the FARC and Colombia’s
agreements with the United States have
undoubtedly caused great tension between the
two countries. However, the resolution and
restoration of diplomatic relations after these
disputes have also shown Colombia’s and
Venezuela’s willingness to cooperate with each
other. For example, after the election of Colom-
bian President Juan Manuel Santos in 2010,
Chávez agreed to cooperate in eliminating any
FARC members living in Venezuelan territory
(Wilpert; Buxton ). Cooperation to eliminate the
FARC stemmed primarily from the security
threat that it posed for both Colombia and
Venezuela. It is obvious that the FARC created
concerns for Colombia due to the violence, drug
trafficking, and kidnapping within its own
borders. The FARC also infiltrated Venezuela
from the border regions and used its military
presence to encamp and attack Venezuela’s mil-
itary forces and citizens. Therefore, both Colom-
bia and Venezuela have identified the neces-
sity of cooperating militarily on border security,
particularly to end the activity of the FARC
but also to end illegal smuggling of drugs and
other goods. 
In addition, Colombia and Venezuela have
found economic incentives to improve cooper-
ation between each other. Before Chávez placed
an embargo on Colombian imports in 2009,
$6 billion of the $7.2 billion (in U.S. dollars)
in trade between the two countries consisted
of Colombian exports to Venezuela. These
Colombian exports included more than two-
thirds of Venezuela’s food supply and were lost
when conflict caused trade and diplomatic rela-
tions to cease. Therefore, tension that ended
trade between the countries required Colombia
to find another trading partner to absorb the $6
billion of exports to Venezuela, and Venezuela
was required to search for another partner to
supply more than two-thirds of its food supply
(Tullos). However, trade between the two coun-
tries began to recover in 2012 as Colombia
and Venezuela sought to make up for the dev-
astating loss of trade during the diplomatic and
economic freezes from 2008 to 2010 (Robert-
son). Therefore, despite recent conflict between
the two countries, Colombia and Venezuela have
improved their economic cooperation through
the reopening of bilateral trade.
Finally, both Colombia and Venezuela
have realized the benefits of cooperating on
more than just military or economic inter-
ests. For example, in 2011, President Santos
and President Chávez met and signed 13 bilat-
eral cooperation agreements, including ones in
health, science, technology, energy, and cul-
ture. These agreements, which broaden the
scope of bilateral relations between Colombia
and Venezuela, go beyond bolstering the move-
ment of products to strengthening the friend-
ship, trust, and policies between the two coun-
tries. One such agreement is an energy project
that would create a binational oil pipeline link-
ing the Venezuelan Orinoco Oil Belt with Colom-
bia’s Pacific coast (Agencia Venezolana . . .).
Other agreements involve improving infrastruc-
ture between the countries and increasing
tourism. Therefore, despite the extreme tension
between Venezuela and Colombia in the first
decade of the twenty-first century, both coun-
tries have since expressed their willingness for
cooperation.
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Conclusion
Beginning with the dissolution of Gran
Colombia in 1831, Colombia and Venezuela have
experienced a history of tensions between each
other. Territorial conflicts emerged immediately
after the dissolution of Gran Colombia over
pride in national identity and competition for
power in the region. Tensions between Colom-
bia and Venezuela were heightened at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century, as Chávez’s
Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement led Colom-
bia and Venezuela to the brink of war. How-
ever, some have argued that Chávez’s reac-
tions to Colombia’s relationship with the United
States and his anger over being accused of
harboring FARC rebels can be attributed to
his technique of “ramping up the rhetoric
over an external threat to distract [Venezuelan
citizens] from domestic problems, such as high
inflation and water and power shortages” (Tul-
los). In other words, Chávez may have tar-
geted Colombia as an enemy in order to rally
support during the economic and political crises
in Venezuela under his leadership, with no
true intentions of actually engaging in war.5
Furthermore, although Chávez cut diplomatic
ties with Colombia three times since 2005, he
did not hesitate to restore relations shortly after,
indicating that he was not serious about becom-
ing involved in armed conflict with Colombia.
Therefore, although Colombia and
Venezuela have engaged in serious conflicts
throughout their history, it is unlikely that
any calls for war will become a reality. In addi-
tion, Colombia and Venezuela have realized the
benefits of cooperation during the Chávez -San-
tos administrations, as their military coopera-
tion provided security against FARC activity and
economic cooperation helped restore bilateral
trade. While future conflict between Colombia
and Venezuela may be inevitable and based on
domestic political concerns (as some have
argued with the Chávez and Maduro adminis-
trations), the cooperation that has emerged
despite nearly a decade of intense conflict has
shown that war is not on the horizon and that
the two countries have found the benefit in
maintaining a peaceful relationship. 
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5A similar tactic of diverting attention away from
domestic political and economic failures can also be seen in
the current administration under President Nicolás Maduro
(who won the presidential election in April 2013). For exam-
ple, in May 2013, Maduro accused former Colombian
President Álvaro Uribe of plotting to assassinate him, a move
that may have been used to create a common enemy abroad
in order to maintain popular support at home (“Venezuelan
Leader . . .”). This lends evidence to the prediction that ten-
sions are likely to remain between Colombia and Venezuela
but that they will not become serious enough to amount
to war. The most recent tensions may be based on targeting
a common enemy (Colombia) in order to quell the unpop-
ularity that citizens have for the Venezuelan government
because of high inflation and poverty rates and increases
in food prices and crime within the country.
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